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At the opening of the first Nevada legislature in 1861, Territorial Governor James W. Nye,
a former New York lawyer, instructed the assembly that they would have to forsake their
inherited Mormon statutes that were ill adapted to “the mining interests” of the new
territory. “Happily for us, a neighboring State whose interests are similar to ours, has
established a code of laws” sufficiently attractive to “capital from abroad.” That neighbor
was California, and Nye urged that California’s “Practice Code” be enacted in Nevada,
as far as it could “be made applicable.”1 Territorial Senator William Morris Stewart, a
famed mining lawyer who would lead the U.S. Senate during Reconstruction, followed
the instructions perhaps too well. Stewart literally cut and pasted the latestWood’s Digest
of the California Practice Act into the session bill, crossing out state and California and
substituting territory and Nevada where necessary. Stewart copied not just California’s
procedure code but also its method of codification, for California had in turn borrowed its
code by modifying New York’s.
Nye wrote back to the assembly in disgust. The bill—of 715 sections—had reached him
late the night before the legislative session was to close. Even in the few hours he had to
read it, Nye counted “many errors in the enrolling of it, numbering probably more than
three hundred.” Some errors were severe. The code overwrote the specific jurisdictional
boundaries of Nevada’s Organic Act by copying California’s arrangements. Error-riddled
and unconstitutional as the bill was, Nye believed a civil practice code was a “universal
necessity and public need,” doubting “whether your courts would be able to fulfill the
purpose of their creation” without one.2 Nye signed the code into law.
Nothing like this “universal necessity” existed when Nye began his legal career in New
York in the 1840s; rather, it was one of the central developments of America law after the
mid-nineteenth century. By 1900, thirty-one American states and territories had adapted
the text of a New York code of civil procedure first promulgated in 1848. The code became
known as the Field Code, after its chief draftsman David Dudley Field, a Manhattan
1Message of the Governor, in Journal of the Council for the Territory of Nevada (1862), 21.
2Nevada Council Journal (1862), 261–62. Act of Congress (1861) Organizing the Territory of Nevada, 12
U.S. Statutes at Large 209–14 (1863). 1861 Nevada Laws 314.
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Figure 1: Detail from Council Bill 21, First Territorial Legislative Session (1861), Nevada
State Library, Archives and Public Records.
2
trial lawyer.3 When Field’s code appeared in the Colorado assembly in 1876, a Denver
newspaper wryly commented, “The scissors and paste-pot we had heretofore confidently
believed were implements peculiar to the newspaper sanctum.” To the editor, the cut-and-
paste code was not just a curiosity of legislative history. Rather, the extensive copying
of Field’s Code threatened the foundations of American popular sovereignty. “The bill
is a long one; the assembly has not the time to devote to it and to give it the scrutiny
that a measure of such importance demands.” Blind approval “would be an injustice to
themselves and a greater wrong and injustice to the people who have a right to demand
that their public servants legislate for the public good.” The code “has been ‘assimilated,’
as we are informed, ‘to the character and requirements of our people,’ whatever that may
mean,” but the editor feared the legislation was the product of “men who have the welfare
of the ‘dear people’ at their tongue’s end always, but never in their hearts.”4
The migration of the Field Code was a central event in Anglo-American legal history,
but no historian has traced the extensive borrowings of the Field text nor recognized the
political furor that greeted the code outside New York.5 Every aspect of a civil justice
system, from the rules granting access to courts, to lawyers, to remedies (whether damages,
injunctions, or seizure of property) was covered by the code, making its New York-specific
rules politically contentious both inside and outside the Empire State. As the Field Code
migrated around the country, commentators in each jurisdiction raised the same complaint:
how could legislation borrowed from another state represent the popular will and best
interests of this state?
Understanding the history of the Field Code requires not only attention to its political
context but also a detailed examination of the substance of what was borrowed and what
was revised in each jurisdiction. Exploring these borrowings is a daunting task, however.
Procedure codes were long, technical documents, and although each jurisdiction copied
large swaths of text, each also modified the text along the way, sometimes with a simple
Nevada for California, sometimes with more foundational changes to civil remedies. Al-
though Stewart’s cut-and-paste code found its way into the archives, most draft legislation
did not, and few codifiers explained in detail how they produced their texts. Traditional
close reading or textual criticism of some 98,000 distinct sections of law across 20,000 pages
3Besides his work on codification, which extended to civil, penal, and even international codes of law, Field
became renown for his trial advocacy. Field argued the winning side in major Reconstruction cases such as Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding the trial of civilians bymilitary commission unconstitutional),
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (striking a loyalty oath as unconstitutional), and United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment only against “state action”).
Field came under heavy censure for his representation of Gilded Age robber barons like Jay Gould, Jim Fisk,
and William “Boss” Tweed, but even Tweed’s chief adversary Samuel Tilden retained Field’s services for
the disputed election of 1876. See Henry Martyn Field, The Life of David Dudley Field (1898); Philip J. Bergan,
“David Dudley Field: A Lawyer’s Life,” in The Fields and the Law (Federal Bar Council, 1986).
4Rocky Mountain News, January 20, 1877.
5Roscoe Pound, “David Dudley Field: AnAppraisal,” andAlison Reppy, “The Field Codification Concept,”
in Alison Reppy, ed.,David Dudley Field: Centenary Essays (New York University School of Law, 1949); Stephen
Subrin, “David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision,” Law
and History Review 6 (1988): 311–373; Robert G. Bone, “Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of
Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules,” Columbia Law Review 89 (1989): 1–118. See
also the literature on procedure and codification cited below.
3
comprising 7.7 million words is simply not a feasible research task for a historian who
wishes to track these borrowings.
Yet by turning to the digital analysis of texts, we have resolved this difficulty and tracked
how states borrowed their codes of civil practice from one another. Within the corpus of
legislation, algorithmic analysis of texts can reverse engineer and visualize what the archive
revealed in figure 1: which texts were borrowed, which modified, and how extensively.6
Our method works especially well for legal texts, for reasons we will explain.
The computational analysis of texts is a method which historians can use across the
discipline to study many topics. We have used text analysis—specifically, methods to
detect text reuse—to show how law migrates through borrowings, just as scholars on
the Viral Texts team have demonstrated how newspaper articles were reprinted in the
nineteenth-century United States.7 While we have developed a method that discovers
borrowings of exact words and phrasings, other forms of digital text analysis can track
the diffusion of concepts. Making due allowance for the specific historical questions and
sources at hand, computational text analysis is broadly applicable to historical problem
that involves the spread of words or ideas. The specific method that we outline could be
extended beyond codes of civil procedure to legal statutes or treatises. Yet it could also be
used, for instance, to track the spread of hymns in collections of hymnbooks in religious
history, or the reuse of sections of medical textbooks in the history of science. Since
historians by and large work with textual sources and increasingly with digitized texts,
computational text analysis should become a part of the historian’s toolbox. Lara Putnam
has recently described the importance of “digitization and OCR, which make words above
all available” for historians to search and read, while observing that “computational tools
can discipline our term-searching if we ask them to.”8 Historians have been slow to take
up text analysis even as the aid to more traditional reading that Putnam recommends. Yet
as we demonstrate in this article, such methods can reveal patterns inaccessible to the
6We have released two repositories with all the code used for this project. Lincoln Mullen, “textreuse:
Detect Text Reuse and Document Similarity,” R package version 0.1.3 (2015–): https://github.com/ropensci/
textreuse, includes our implementation of LSH and other algorithms suitable for use by other scholars. (This
package was peer-reviewed by rOpenSci, a collective of academic developers who use the R programming
language.) A second repository contains all of our code specific to the migration of the Field Code: https:
//github.com/lmullen/civil-procedure-codes/. These are the most essential software packages that we
used, except for those cited elsewhere: R Core Team, “R: A language and environment for statistical
computing,” R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria (2016): https://www.R-project.org/;
Hadley Wickham and Romain Francois, “dplyr: A Grammar of Data Manipulation,” R package version 0.4.3
(2016): https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=dplyr; Hadley Wickham and Winston Chang. “ggplot2: An
Implementation of the Grammar of Graphics,” R package version 2.1.0 (2016): https://CRAN.R-project.org/
package=ggplot2; Hadley Wickham, “stringr: Simple, Consistent Wrappers for Common String Operations,”
R package version 1.0.0 (2016): https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=stringr; Hadley Wickham, “tidyr:
Easily Tidy Data,” R package version 0.4.1 (2016): https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=tidyr; Gabor
Csardi and T. Nepusz, “The igraph Software Package for Complex Network Research,” InterJournal, Complex
Systems 1695 (2006): http://igraph.org.
7Ryan Cordell and David A. Smith, Viral Texts: Mapping Networks of Reprinting in 19th-Century Newspapers
and Magazines, NULab for Texts Maps and Networks, Northeastern University (2012–): http://viraltexts.org.
8Lara Putnam, “The Transnational and the Text-Searchable: Digitized Sources and the Shadows They
Cast,” American Historical Review 121, no. 2 (2016): 399–400.
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traditional historian.9
The first contribution of this article is to demonstrate our methods as applied to a corpus
of nineteenth-century civil procedure codes. The second contribution is to integrate what
we learned from the text analysis with the more conventional approaches of political and
cultural history to explain why the migration of the Field Code mattered. On the national
level the extent of legislative borrowing followed a pattern American historians have
described as a “Greater Reconstruction” in which the former Confederate South and the
Far West showed a remarkable kinship. Scholars have typically described Greater Recon-
struction as a federal development, featuring the creation of national citizenship, a national
economy, and a larger federal apparatus centered in Washington, D.C. This article shows
that Greater Reconstruction had its state-level dimensions as well. The uniform practice
of law and adjudication of civil remedies was not structured by Washington mandates,
however, but by the anxiety that New York financial capital would follow only New York
civil remedies. At the more local level, our digital computations can trace modifications
within code traditions, for instance, the ways western and midwestern codifiers altered
New York’s law to accommodate hardening conceptions of racial competencies in the civil
courts.
1. The origin and political controversies of the Field Code
Until 1848, civil remedies and trial practice in New York were largely governed by common
law traditions loosely categorized as “practice and pleadings.”10 To understand how to
9Only a few historians have used computational text analysis, including Cameron Blevins, “Space,
Nation, and the Triumph of Region: A View of the World from Houston,” Journal of American History
101, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 122–47, doi:10.1093/jahist/jau184; Benjamin M. Schmidt, Sapping Attention
(blog): http://sappingattention.blogspot.com/; Sharon Block, “Doing More with Digitization: An In-
troduction to Topic Modeling of Early American Sources,” Common-Place 6, no. 2 (January 2006): http:
//www.common-place.org/vol-06/no-02/tales/; Dan Cohen, Frederick Gibbs, Tim Hitchcock, Geoffrey
Rockwell, et al., “Data Mining with Criminal Intent,” white paper, 31 August 2011, http://criminalintent.org;
Robert K. Nelson, “Mining the Dispatch, website, Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond,
http://dsl.richmond.edu/dispatch/; Dan Cohen,”Searching for the Victorians," 4 October 2010: http://
www.dancohen.org/2010/10/04/searching-for-the-victorians/; Micki Kaufmann, “Everything on Paper Will
Be Used Against Me:” Quantifying Kissinger, digital project (2012–16): http://blog.quantifyingkissinger.com/;
E. Thomas Ewing, Samah Gad, Bernice L. Hausman, Kathleen Kerr, Bruce Pencek, and Naren Ramakrish-
nan, “An Epidemiology of Information: Datamining the 1918 Flu Pandemic,” project research report (2
April 2014): http://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/46991/An%20Epidemiology%20of%
20Information%20Project%20Research%20Report_Final.pdf?sequence=1; Michelle Moravec, “ ‘Under this
name she is fitly described’: A Digital History of Gender in the History of Woman Suffrage” (March 2015):
http://womhist.alexanderstreet.com/moravec-full.html.
10When law professors such as New York’s David Graham Jr. (a collaborator on the Field Code) began
to be appointed to university positions, the chair for instruction in legal practice or procedure carried this
designation of “practice and pleadings.” Today that field is described as “civil procedure,” a field that grew
out of David Dudley Field’s codification. The history of practice and procedure is a staple of general legal
history. See Frederick Pollock and Frederick Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2
vols., 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1898); Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed. (Liberty
Fund, 2010); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3rd ed. (Touchstone, 2005). Few book-length
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file a civil claim or to enforce a judgment, a lawyer had to consult ad hoc statutes from
colonial times to the present as well as precedents reported from cases litigated at common
law and chancery. By the 1840s, enterprising practitioners had collated these materials
into a half dozen marketable treatises, but these remained works of private opinion—
no court was bound to agree with the treatise writers as to the weight, relevance, or
proper interpretation of a legal statement.11 The common law was accordingly known
as “unwritten law” despite the proliferation of published texts, because the common law
was not precisely determined until a particular case demanded resolution.12 Statutes, on
the other hand, were “written law,” prescribing or reforming the rules even before a case
put the precise question in issue. Within the realm of written law, codes were the ultimate
statutes.13
Codification is, as Lawrence Friedman has written, “one of the set pieces of American
legal history.” Law reformers advocated for a codification of the common law from the
earliest days of the Republic through the Gilded Age, from Massachusetts down to South
Carolina. Efforts ranged from mere compilations of existing statutes in each state to a
full European-style codification meant to be an entirely comprehensive and systematic
statement of the law.14 At its most basic level, codification proposed that legislative policy
ought to be the sole source of law. Law was to be made by democratically responsible
works have been dedicated to the subject, however. The exceptions are Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure
of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective (New York University School of Law 1952); Edward Purcell, Litigation
and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 1870–1958 (Oxford, 1992); John H. Langbein
et al., History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions (Aspen, 2009); and
to some extent, William E. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on
Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830, 2nd ed. (University of Georgia Press, 1994).
11For the rise of treatises in America generally, see G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural
Change, 1815–1835 (1988) and A. W. B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and
the Forms of Legal Literature,” in Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law (Hambledon Press,
1987), 273–320. The most instructive treatises for New York practice in the 1840s were Oliver L. Barbour, A
Treatise on the Practice of the Court of Chancery (1844); Alexander M. Burrill, Treatise on the Practice of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, 2 vols. (1846); David Graham, A Treatise on on the Practice of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, 3rd ed. (1847); David Graham, A Treatise on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the
Courts of Law and Equity in the State of New York (1839); Claudius L. Monell, A Treatise on the Practice of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York (1849); Joseph W. Moulton, The Chancery Practice of the State of New York
(1829), 2 vols.; and as a general introduction to the field, the Englishman Henry John Stephen’s Treatise on the
Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (2d. ed. 1828).
12See Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760–1850 (Clarendon Press 1991);
Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought before Modernism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); David M. Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought
and the Transatlantic Turn to History (Cambridge 2013).
13Or, to use a term from contemporary analysis, “super statutes.” WilliamN. Eskridge and John Ferejohn,A
Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). See also David
Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-century Britain (Cambridge 1989);
Farah Peterson, Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Authority, 1776–1860 (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University, September 2015).
14Friedman, A History of American Law, 302. See also Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement:
A Study in Antebellum Legal Reform (1983); Robert W. Gordon, “The American Codification Movement,”
Vanderbilt Law Review 36 (1983): 431–458; Maurice Eugen Lang, Codification in the British Empire and America
(Lawbook Exchange, 1924).
6
legislators in terse, unambiguous statements, not discovered through application and
analogy in particular cases by the judges. Debates over codification thus ranged from the
metaphysics of law to political theories of institutional competency and the separation of
powers.15 Codification remained a major interest of the American bar across the nineteenth
century. When the intellectual historian Perry Miller developed a reader surveying The
Legal Mind in America, codification was its central theme, as Miller argued it was the only
intellectual topic that attracted lawyers away from their practices long enough to debate.16
The importance of codification extended far beyond the United States. Napoleonic France
promulgated a series of codes in the early nineteenth century, Germans debated the
wisdom of codification after Napoleon’s fall, and in the 1860s the British imposed codes on
their colonies in India and Singapore. Many American lawyers followed the international
development of these codes with interest, viewing codification as the leading edge of
modern legal science.17
In New York, these codification debates came to a head at the 1846 constitutional con-
vention, where “the conquerors took all,” as the ambivalent Jacksonian James Fenimore
Cooper complained.18 Law reformers abolished the court of chancery, made judges stand
15The most influential account has been Morton Horwitz’s, which declares that “the desire to separate law
and politics has always been a central aspiration of the American legal profession” in order to protect elite
interests against popular democracy. Horwitz identifies “orthodox legal thought” and “orthodox lawyers”
with the elite of the American bar who sought to shield the law from political interference, which above all
meant crusading against legislation and especially codification. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780–1850 (Oxford University Press, 1977), 258–59. Recent work has challenged Horwitz’s
account by showing how elite common law lawyers, particularly Horwitz’s main target James Coolidge
Carter, were actually political progressives who supported redistributive legislation such as the income
tax. See, for instance, Rabban, Law’s History, 322–77; Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy, 230–41;
Lewis A. Grossman, “James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence,” Law & History Review 20, no.
3 (2002): 577–629. These accounts follow Horwitz, however, in focusing on the few outspoken opponents
of codification, rather than the elite lawyers who sponsored the procedure codes. Among the latter group
could be found some of the most devout theorists of laissez faire economics in nineteenth-century America,
including David Dudley Field and his brother, the Supreme Court Justice Stephen Johnson Field.
16Perry Miller, ed., The Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War (Anchor 1962).
17See James Q. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: Historical Vision and Legal
Change (Princeton, 1990); Gunther A. Weiss, “The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World,
Yale Journal of International Law 25 (2000): 435; Maurice Eugen Lang, Codification in the British Empire and
America (Lawbook Exchange, 1924); Jean-Louis Halperin, The French Civil Code (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2006); Robert B. Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1981); R. H. Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code (Paul M. Herbert Law Center, 1987); Brian Young,
The Politics of Codification: The Lower Canadian Civil Code of 1866 (Osgoode Society, 1994); John W. Cairns,
Codification, Transplants, and History: Law Reform in Louisiana (1808) and Quebec (1866) (Clark, NJ: Talbot,
2015); Roscoe Pound,”The French Civil Code and the Spirit of Nineteenth Century Law," Boston Law Review
35 (1955): 79. On common theories of codification that transcended jurisdictional boundaries, see Csaba
Varga, Codification as a Socio-Historical Phenomenon, 2nd ed. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2011 [1991]); Roger
Berkowitz, The Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition (New York: Fordham University Press,
2010).
18James Fenimore Cooper, The Ways of the Hour: A Tale (1850), 84. For an analysis of Cooper’s philosophy
of law and his critique of the New York constitution, see Charles Hansford Adams, “The Guardian of the Law”:
Authority and Identity in James Fenimore Cooper (Penn State University Press, 1990), 135–48. See also Marvin
Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford, 1957), 57–100.
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for popular election, and required the legislature to appoint commissioners to codify the
law and reform the “practice and pleadings” of the civil courts.19
NewYorkers had twomodels of legislative commissions onwhich they could draw for their
own law reforms. The French government under Napoleon had appointed five-member
commissions to codify the law of France. When the New York law reformer William
Sampson called for codification in a widely noted address to the New-York Historical
Society, one of the members of the French commission living in exile in upstate New York
wrote to Sampson. He advised Sampson on the mechanics of codification: “Let four or five
good heads be united in a commission, to frame in silence the project of a code. It is not so
difficult a task. It is only to consult together, and to select. Do so with your best authors as
we did with ours, . . . which we simply converted into articles of our code.” Tellingly, the
French commissioner took it as granted that the commission’s code would automatically
be promulgated as law.20
The other model came from England. Royal commissions had been employed since before
the Revolution of 1688 to advise on a variety of matters. Although by the mid-nineteenth
century royal commissions sometimes offered model statutes, Parliament maintained
exclusive legislative prerogatives, forcing any commissioner-proposed legislation to pass
through the normal politicking and drafting processes of Parliament.21
After David Dudley Field and two other lawyers were appointed to the procedural commis-
sion, their reports made clear that they favored the French model but understood political
realities would hold them to the English model. From 1847 to 1850, the commissioners
made five reports to the legislature knowing they had no power to keep legislators from
amending their code or even defeating it altogether. Each time they reminded legislators
that “public opinion had issued its mandate in the most imposing form” of a constitutional
decree. The constitution, together with the legislative act appointing the commission,
“gave the commissioners instructions so precise, as to leave them no discretion, if they
19On the politics and reforms of the NewYork Convention of 1846, see Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional
History of New York from the Beginning of the Colonial Period to the Year 1905 (Rochester, 1905), 2:10–101; Charles
McCurdy, The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 1839–1865 (University of North Carolina, 2001); Jed
Shugerman, The People’s Courts: The Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Power in America (Harvard University
Press, 2012).
20Count Pierre François Réal to William Sampson, October 27, 1824, in Sampson’s Discourse and Cor-
respondence with Various Learned Jurists Upon the History of the Law (1826), 191; Maxwell Bloomfield,
“William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of American Legal Reform,” American Journal of Legal History
11, no 3. (1967): 234–252; Walter J. Walsh, “William Sampson, a Republican Constitution, and the Conundrum
of Orangeism on American Soil, 1824–1831,” Radharc 5 (2006): 1–32; William Sampson, Memoirs, 2nd ed.
(1817). On French-style codifications, see Robert B. Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution (Louisiana State,
1981); R. H. Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code (Paul M. Herbert Law Center, 1987); Brian Young,
The Politics of Codification: The Lower Canadian Civil Code of 1866 (Osgoode Society, 1994); John W. Cairns,
Codification, Transplants, and History: Law Reform in Louisiana (1808) and Quebec (1866) (Talbot, 2015); Roscoe
Pound, “The French Civil Code and the Spirit of Nineteenth Century Law,” Boston University Law Review 35
(1955): 79.
21Thomas J. Lockwood, “A History of Royal Commissions,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 5 (1967): 172; Barbara
Lauriat, “ ‘The Examination of Everything’: Royal Commissions in British Legal History,” Statute Law Review
31 (2010): 24; Joanna Innes, Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-century Britain
(Oxford, 2009).
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had desired it, [and] promised them therefore in advance, so long as they obeyed those
instructions, the concurrence and co-operation of all departments of the government.”22
Although the theory of codification made it a democratic enterprise, in practice Jackso-
nians like Field insisted the democratic legislature ought to defer to the expertise of the
commissioners.
The Field commission sought to blunt criticism by insisting that political concerns about
lawmaking did not apply to mere procedure. “The system of procedure by which law is
administered, differs from the law itself in this,” the commissioners explained: “the latter
is a body of elementary rules founded in the immutable principles of justice, drawing
their origin from the obligations which divine wisdom has imposed . . . ; while the former
consists, in its very nature, but of a body of prescribed rules, having no source but the will
of those by whom they are laid down.” Substantive law was universal, natural, grounded
in divine justice, and therefore entitled to respect and protection from change. But God
cared nothing of the “the mere machinery by which law is to be administered.” Thus,
the commissioners argued, procedure was trivial enough for legislative experimentation
but complicated enough that only master practitioners like themselves could run the
experiment.23
Yet the code’s scope of “procedure” included far more than the “mere machinery” of
a lawsuit.24 The final draft of the code, printed in 1850, spanned nearly 800 pages of
1,885 regulations. The first third of the code covered constitutional topics, specifying
the jurisdiction of all state courts and the duties of all state officers (and liabilities for
violating those duties). The code deregulated attorney compensation, introducing novel
22Second Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading (New York, 1849), 3–4. See also, First
Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings (New York, 1848), iii-iv; Third Report of the
Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings (New York, 1849), 3, Lillian Goldman Law Library Rare Books
Collection; Final Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, in Documents of the Assembly of
the State of New York, 73d sess., vol. 2, no. 16 (New York, 1850), viii.
23Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, in New York Assembly Documents, 70th sess.,
vol. 2, no. 202 (1847), 3–4.
24Working under this theory, the Field commission defined the content of the modern field of civil procedure.
While western legal systems had long distinguished between the law of persons and things on the one
hand, and the law of actions (the rules of litigation) on the other, in the Anglo-American tradition, the
categories remained intermixed into the nineteenth century. Whether one had a substantive legal right (to
property, to marry, to an office, etc.) depended upon whether and how one would sue for a remedy to
vindicate that right. Blackstone’s Commentaries attempted to describe English law in the more European
terms of persons/things/actions, and Jeremy Bentham offered a more refined terminology of “substantive”
law and “procedural” or “adjective” law, but until the Field Code no Anglo-American jurist had specified
with precision where the line lay between substantive and procedural law. See Lobban, The Common Law
and English Jurisprudence, 127–131, 146–151. As Amalia Kessler notes, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary did not
even define civil procedure until its 1897 edition, describing the term as “rather a modern one.” Amalia
Kessler, “Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and
the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 10 (2009):
481–482; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1897), 2:764. Before 1848, the term was largely restricted to French usage,
and American remedial law had carried the typical designation—as it did both in Graham’s treatise and
professorial title—of “practice and pleadings,” the name likewise given to the reform commission. When the
commission designated its final draft a “Code of Civil Procedure,” it marked the first American attempt to
give content to this category.
9
structures of retainers and contingency fees.25 It created summary procedures meant to
accelerate debt collection while simultaneously carving out “homestead” exemptions from
the sheriff’s reach.26 The code concluded by defining who could be an attorney, a juror,
and a witness, drawing racial and gendered distinctions over who could speak in court.27
Most important, the code defined all the remedies that a civil court could order—from
money damages, to partition of property, to injunctive decrees and contempts—and made
those remedies available in every lawsuit. In many cases, a legal right was indistinguish-
able from the remedy that secured that right: the right to possess a particular piece of
property and the remedy that seized and delivered that property were, in effect, the same
thing. Remedies were thus intimately connected to substantive law. For that reason,
neither the French code de procédure civile (1806) nor Blackstone or Bentham’s writings con-
ceived of remedies as purely procedural.28 By codifying remedies, Field invited continual
expansion of the category of “procedure.” As other states adopted the procedure code,
they sometimes included other fields of law that seemed obviously “substantive” yet had
such specific procedures or remedies that they were placed in a “code of procedure.” Such
fields included the law of wills, corporations, and mortgages.29 And after all, argued
procedural codifiers in Iowa, what did the famed Married Women’s Property Acts offer
besides procedural reform? These acts gave women standing to litigate in their own name
and seek remedies in claims of property and contract, and they abolished mandatory rules
25Final Report of the Commissioners, 368–378, tit. 10. See also Peter Karsten, “Enabling the Poor to Have
Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940,” DePaul Law Review
47 (1998): 231; Norman Spaulding, “The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to
Counsel,” Fordham Law Review 73 (2004): 983; John Leubsdorf, “Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery,” Law and Contemporary Problems 47 (1984): 9.
26On debt collection, see Part 4 below. On homestead exemptions, see Final Report of the Commissioners,
353–354, § 839; James W. Ely, “Homestead Exemption and Southern Legal Culture,” in Sally Hadden &
Patricia Minter eds., Signposts: New Directions in Southern Legal History (University of Georgia 2013), 289–314;
Paul Goodman, “The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodation and
Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840–1880,” Journal of American History 80, no. 2 (1993): 470–498.
27Final Report of the Commissioners, 202–203, § 506 (restricting admission as an attorney to male citizens),
110, § 251 (restricting jury service to white male citizens), 714–715, § 1708 (permitting “all persons, without
exceptions” to be witnesses in civil cases).
28On the French procedure code, see C. H. van Rhee, European Traditions in Civil Procedure (Antwerp 2005).
Bentham, the leading proponent of codification in England, argued that procedure was the one department
of the law that ought to remain uncodified. So long as the law of civil and criminal obligations and the law
of property were sufficiently codified, a “natural procedure” arising from judicial discretion and flexibility
would be superior to “technical” written rules. Later in his career Bentham produced the “Outlines of a
Procedure Code” as a “provisional” remedy, but he insisted that a procedure code on its own could not
be “invested with the form of law” without “reference to the codes of law, penal and non-penal, to which
it has for its object and purpose the giving execution and effect.” Although it spanned nearly 200 pages,
Bentham’s code favored general moral maxims over precise details, for instance: “On each occasion, have
constant regard for all the several ends of justice; that is to say, minimize the sum, or the balance of evil.”
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure with the Outline of a Procedure Code, in John Bowring,
ed.,Works of Jeremy Bentham, 2nd ed. (1843 [1839]), 1–189, preface and 28, ch. 7 § 1. See Lobban, The Common
Law, 127–131.
29See Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana (1852), 2:245–320 (wills); Public Statutes of the State of
Minnesota (1859), 643–647, ch. 75 (mortgages); The Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California (1880),
419–420, tit. 6, 657–659, art. 5 (corporations).
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of joinder (of husbands). Thus, one of the most significant changes to the law of property
and domestic relations in the century went into the state’s Code of Civil Procedure.30
Despite Field’s arguments that a mere procedure code was democratically unproblematic,
his efforts were not entirely successful in New York. The commission submitted a draft
of its main reforms in 1848, emphasizing that this first code was “but a report in part.”
New York’s legislators enacted the partial code with little amendment, some legislators
repeating Field’s view that the constitution obligated them to accept the code.31 But when
the commissioners submitted an extended draft in 1849, the Assembly judiciary commit-
tee balked, directly disputing the commissioners’ claims that procedure was merely the
machinery of the law. The “provisions for rights and for the mode of pursuing remedies,
insensibly run into each other,” the committee reported, complicating legal practice “in-
finitely more than any machine of human contrivance.” They therefore suspected the
commissioners’ forthcoming code of criminal procedure would include all of the criminal
law as well, “as they seem to understand practice and pleadings to include all the law
upon a given subject.” That being the case, the committee wondered whether they should
“place in [the commissioners] a blind and implicit confidence that shall commit to their
discretion the peace and property, the personal liberty and the lives of those who sent us
here to make laws for them?”32
The code would encounter similar difficulties in each jurisdiction that adopted it. Even
the shortest version of the Field Code was significantly longer than any other state statute
before the Progressive legislation of the twentieth century. Unlike statutory compilations
that sometimes took the name of a “code” but made no changes to existing law, the Field
Code opened by abolishing the hallmarks of prior practice and instituting “hereafter” a
new form of action with substantial revisions to basic matters of civil remedies.33 In the
states where it was imported, there was no getting around the fact that the code introduced
much new law, yet legislators were unable to read, critique, and amend the code within
the brief period of a legislative session. “It is folly to undertake to pass a code in a sixty
day session,” wrote the Montana Post, “and the best way would be for the Assembly to
select one from a State or Territory which would come near meeting our wants, and slide it
30Report of the Code Commissioners to the Eighth General Assembly of the State of Iowa (1859), 296,
note to § 172 (“The right to sue, follows necessarily from the right of property.”) On the significance of the
Married Women’s Property Acts, see, e.g., Hendrik Hartog,Man and Wife in America: A History (Harvard
2000), 111–113, 187–192, 290–292.
31First Report of the Commissioners, iv. For legislative debates on the Code, see “Legislative Acts and
Proceedings,” Albany Evening Journal, Mar. 31, 1848.
32Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Bill to Continue in Office the Commissioners on Practice
and Pleadings, in New York Assembly Documents, 72d sess., vol. 3, no. 47 (New York, 1849), 2, 12–15.
33Final Report of the Commissioners, 225–226, § 554. For examples of “codes” that did not alter previously
enacted statutes, see, for instance, Report, Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and Assembly of the State
of Tennessee (1857), 191 (“The digest presents the law substantially as it now exists in the State. I have neither
felt at liberty nor deemed it advisable to innovate largely upon the established system.”); 1897 New Mexico
Compiled Laws 9 (“The commissioners were given no authority to revise.”); 1866 Illinois Compiled Laws v
(“We cannot change the text, but we can arrange and systematize the entire legislation of the state upon any
given subject.”); 1849 Wisconsin Revised Statutes, “Advertisement” (commission “directed the subscriber
to arrange the chapters into parts and titles as he thought proper, re-arranging the order of the sections or
transposing them from one chapter to another, whenever it would not alter the meaning of the law.”).
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Figure 2: This map shows which states adopted codes of civil procedure based on the New
York Field Code. The date shown is the date of the first enactment of a procedure code;
most states subsequently revised their codes. Note that many southern states and western
states came to adopt the Field Code during the Civil War and Reconstruction. By the end of
the nineteenth century, thirty-one jurisdictions (those displayed on the map, plus Alaska)
had adopted a version of the Field Code. Data adapted from Charles McGuffey Hepburn,
The Historical Development of Code Pleading in America and England (1897).
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through with the fewest changes possible.”34 Sliding the code through eased the problem
of time but exacerbated the problem of local sovereignty. “To be governed by a foreign law,
especially when that law is not preknown to the people whose conduct is to be regulated
thereby . . . is something repugnant to the idea of Democratic Republican government,”
complained the The Miner’s Express in Iowa.35
How, then, did states and territories achieve a politically acceptable balance between
efficiency and sovereignty, borrowing law for sake of time but endowing it with popular
legitimacy in each locale? Quite apart from the technicalities of legal practice, the American
federation of civil government into (depending on the year) more than thirty or forty
separate jurisdictions makes it hard to describe a phenomenon that was truly national
despite its state-centered enactments. It requires a sense of how much law was borrowed
in each location and to what degree innovations were introduced. But precisely because
these questions concern codes—texts that comprehensively and systematically cover a
given subject—they are ideal sources for the techniques of digital history.
2. Detecting borrowings among procedure codes
To discover how the Field Code migrated to other jurisdictions, we compiled a corpus of
potentially relevant laws, including separately bound codes of civil procedure as well as
codes or statutes appearing within session laws and statutory compilations from around
the Atlantic world. The corpus comprises 135 statutes from the nineteenth century, which
amounts to 7.7 million words organized into 98,000 regulations. It includes the initial en-
actment of every U.S. code of civil procedure, as well as procedure statutes and re-enacted
codes from jurisdictions reputed to have been legally influential, including French and
British codes. The corpus does not include every nineteenth-century statute of procedural
law. While a comprehensive project may be illuminating in its own ways, our specific
question of how New York legislation influenced other American jurisdictions permits a
more curated corpus.36
Curating a corpus to answer a specific question is one of two ways in which digital
history can proceed. To quote Jason Heppler, digital history–like all historical work—can
begin either “with a corpus looking for a question, or a question looking for a corpus.”
Computational text analysis in digital history is often conceived of as beginning with
sources, particularly with large datasets such as the Google Books or Hathi Trust corpora.
These large corpora are sometimes called “big data”—though it must be emphasized
almost never by digital historians who actually work with them—on which “distant
reading” can be practiced. While it is salutary for historians to have their research questions
shaped by the broadest possible contexts, it is not apparent that digital historians can
readily move from these omnibus corpora to answering the specific research questions that
34Montana Post, January 21, 1865.
35The Miner’s Express (Dubuque, IA), February 26, 1851.
36For full citations to all of the codes that we used, plus links to electronic versions at the Hathi Trust,
Google Books or other sources when available, see Kellen Funk, “American Civil Procedure: Law on the
Books” (2015–16): http://kellenfunk.org/civil-procedure/procedure-law/.
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animate various historical fields. In this article we demonstrate an alternative approach,
which we might unimaginatively label “medium data.” The amount of legislation that
governed American civil practice is impressive, since every state amended and re-enacted
procedure statutes nearly every decade. But while a corpus of procedural legislation
requires some computational sophistication, the techniques are far less complex than
those derived for truly big data. We have gathered a large but narrowly constrained
corpus centered on solving a well-defined research question.37 This corpus is large enough
that digital historical methods provide results that a scholar could not obtain through
traditional methods, but sufficiently circumscribed so as to directly address a discipline-
and field-specific question.38
37Our approach draws on an earlier generation of digital history which collected sources, as exemplified in
The Valley of the Shadow project: William G. Thomas III and Edward L. Ayers, “The Differences Slavery Made:
A Close Analysis of Two American Communities,” The American Historical Review 108, no. 5 (December 1,
2003): 1299–1307, doi:10.1086/587017. See also Dan Cohen and Roy Rosenzweig, Digital History: A Guide
to Gathering, Preserving, and Presenting the Past on the Web (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2005), ch. 6, digital edition hosted at Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and NewMedia, George Mason
University: http://chnm.gmu.edu/digitalhistory/.
38We have preferred to use the term “digital history” when referring to our own work, in part because
the term “digital humanities” has largely come to refer to the work of digital literary and digital media
scholars, but primarily because wewish to see digital scholars make disciplinary, rather than interdisciplinary
contributions. We are working primarily in the field formerly known as humanities computing, but there
are other forms of digital history such as digital public history or spatial history. On the role of disciplines
and the importance of field specific argumentation, see, Stephen Robertson, “The Differences between
Digital Humanities and Digital History,” 289–307, and Cameron Blevins, “Digital History’s Perpetual Future
Tense,” 308–324, both in Debates in the Digital Humanities 2016, ed. Matthew K. Gold and Lauren F. Klein
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); William G. Thomas III, “The Promise of the Digital
Humanities and the Contested Nature of Digital Scholarship,” in A New Companion to the Digital Humanities,
edited by Susan Schreibman, Ray Siemens, and John Unsworth (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 524–37.
Nevertheless, digital text analysis in the humanities has mostly been published by literary scholars, including
Stephen Ramsay, Reading Machines: Toward an Algorithmic Criticism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
2011); Franco Moretti, Distant Reading (New York: Verso, 2013); Matthew L. Jockers,Macroanalysis: Digital
Methods and Literary History (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013); Ted Underwood, Why Literary
Periods Mattered: Historical Contrast and the Prestige of English Studies (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2013). Related but less well regarded by humanities scholars is work in “culturomics”: see Jean-Baptiste
Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books”, Science 331, no. 6014
(2011), 176–182; doi:10.1126/science.1199644. On the uselessness of the term “big data,” see Ted Underwood,
“Against (Talking About) ‘Big Data,’ ” The Stone and the Shell, blog post, 10 May 2013: https://tedunderwood.
com/2013/05/10/why-it-matters-that-we-dont-know-what-we-mean-by-big-data/. For an overview of
digital history projects involving text analysi, see the Roberston essay cited above. For an example of
curating a corpus aimed at research questions, see Ted Underwood, Boris Capitanu, Peter Organisciak, Sayan
Bhattacharyya, Loretta Auvil, Colleen Fallaw, J. Stephen Downie, “Word Frequencies in English-Language
Literature, 1700–1922,” dataset, v0.2 (HathiTrust Research Center, 2015) doi:10.13012/J8JW8BSJ.
Only a few scholars have turned their attention to the computer analysis of legal texts for historical
purposes, including Paul Craven, “Detección automática y visualización de dominios específicos similares
en documentos: análisis DWIC y su aplicación en el Proyecto Master & Servant [Automatic Detection and
Visualization of Domain-Specific Similarities in Documents: DWIC Analysis and its Application in the
Master & Servant Project],” published on CD-ROM in F. J. A Perez et al., eds., La Historia en una nueva
frontera [History in a New Frontier] (Digibis: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1998); Paul
Craven and Douglas Hay, “Computer Applications in Comparative Historical Research: The Master &
Servant Project at York University, Canada,” History and Computing 7, no. 2 (1995); Paul Craven and W.
Traves, “A General-Purpose Hierarchical Coding Engine and Its Application to Comparative Analysis of
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Because most codes were public statutes, they were widely printed and distributed and
therefore found their way into libraries digitized by Google Books. We drew primarily
from the Google Books, filling in gaps from other databases as necessary. We used optical
character recognition software (OCR) to create plain-text versions of the codes, which we
edited lightly, correcting section markers by hand as necessary and writing a script to fix
the most obvious OCR errors.39
The most important step we took in processing the files was to split each section of the
code into its own text file. Codes varied in how they were organized, but they all divided
specific regulations into sections (or, on occasion, articles). Not only does the discursive form
of these texts provide a handy organizational scheme for digital methods, but historically
sections were also the way legislators borrowed their texts. Codifiers took their sources
apart by sections, rearranging here, editing, drafting, and then re-combining there. Despite
the fact that states differed widely on what topics they included in “civil procedure,”
sectioning the codes allowed us to assess similarity even among codes of quite different
lengths and coverage. For instance, we know that California’s 1851 code was derived
from New York’s 1850 code. (Stephen J. Field, David Dudley’s brother, was the lawyer
who imported New York’s code into California.40) But the New York code is over 150,000
words long, whereas California’s code was just over 50,000 words long. Those disparate
lengths mean that comparing all of the California code to all of the New York code is less
meaningful than comparing each section in the California code to each section in the New
York code, where matching sections will have a similar length.
Having divided the texts according to a historically justified pattern, our next step was
to compare each section to every other section and measure the similarity between them.
To continue the New York-to-California example, consider the following pairs of sections.
The first pair is from the final draft of the New York Field Code. These sections completely
abolished prior practice and began to rebuild the procedure system from the ground up
(figure 3).
In the theory of Euro-American lawyers, California had no prior practice to abolish, so the
Statutes,” Literary and Linguistic Computing 8, no. 1 (1993): 27–32, doi:10.1093/llc/8.1.27; Eric C. Nystrom
and David S. Tanenhaus, “The Future of Digital Legal History: No Magic, No Silver Bullets,” American
Journal of Legal History 56, no. 1 (2016): 150–67, doi:10.1093/ajlh/njv017; Dan Cohen, Frederick Gibbs, Tim
Hitchcock, Geoffrey Rockwell, et al., “Data Mining with Criminal Intent,” white paper, 31 August 2011,
http://criminalintent.org.
39In each instance we downloaded an entire volume of sessions laws, statutory compilations, or single-
volume codes of procedure and then cropped out irrelevant pages, marginalia and footnoted commentary,
leaving only the statutory text. After several trials of various implementations of Tesseract (open source) and
I.R.I.S. (proprietary) OCR programs, we determined that Nitro Pro PDF, which relies on I.R.I.S. software, of-
fered the best OCR tool for this project. I.R.I.S. provides slightly more accurate readings of nineteenth-century
typefaces than Tesseract, and Nitro Pro’s implementation makes words, not characters, the fundamental unit
of output. The latter feature made cropping between marginalia and the statute more reliable. We removed
hyphenated line breaks and standardized spelling for common terms that evolved over the nineteenth
century (e.g., indorsement).
40William Wirt Blume, “Adoption in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A Chapter in
American Legal History,” Hastings Law Journal 17 (1966): 701; Stephen J. Field, Personal Reminiscences of Early
Days in California (1893), 75–78.
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Figure 3: Final Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings (New York, 1850),
225–25, §§ 554–555.
code began more simply (figure 4).
Figure 4: 1851 California Laws 51 §§ 1–2.
The pairs are obviously related to one another, both in terms of their legal force and in
terms of the actual words used.
A common method for measuring the similarity of two documents involves dividing
texts up into tokens of consecutive words (called n-grams) and calculating a Jaccard
similarity score, defined as ratio between the number of tokens that the two document
have in common to the total number of tokens that appear in both documents. We used
five-word tokens and shingled them, meaning that for the New York sections above, the
first token was “the distinction between actions at,” the second token was “distinction
between actions at law,” and so on. These tokens each contain more meaning than a single
16
word, yet because they are shingled they are robust to changes in the text or noisy OCR. A
Jaccard similarity score will always be in a range between 0 (complete dissimilarity) and 1
(complete similarity).41
Comparing the section pairs above produces the matrix of similarity scores in table 1.
Table 1: A subset of the section-to-section similarity
matrix.
NY1850-554 NY1850-555 CA1851-001 CA1851-002
NY1850-554 0 0.14 0
NY1850-555 0 0.41
CA1851-001 0
CA1851-002
As we would expect the first sections (New York § 554 and California § 1) have a score
of 0.14, which indicates that they are similar but have significant differences, while the
second sections (New York § 555 to California § 2) have a much higher similarity score
of 0.41 since only a few words were changed. Just as important, when we compare the
first section in New York to the second section in California, we get a score of 0; the two
sections are nothing like each other.
The aim, then, was to create a triangular matrix like the one above, but with approximately
98,000 rows and 98,000 columns, containing the similarity scores for each possible pair of
sections. While this is easy enough to conceptualize, such a matrix is actually quite large,
containing about 4.8 billion comparisons. This would take an unreasonable amount of
computation time, and most of these comparisons would be unnecessary since each section
has no relationship to most other sections. We therefore implemented the minhash/locality
sensitive hashing algorithm to detect pairs of possible matches quickly. Instead of com-
paring all tokens to one another, this algorithm samples tokens from each document to
find probable matches, and then Jaccard scores can be calculated for only those probable
matches (that is, many of the needless calculations that produce scores of zero get cut
out).42
41The formal definition of the Jaccard similarity for two sets, A and B, is J(A, B) = |A\B||A[B| .
42We implemented LSH as described in Jure Leskovec, Anand Rajaraman, and Jeff Ullman, Mining of
Massive Datasets, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 3, http://www.mmds.org; the algo-
rithm was first described in Andrei Z. Broder, “On the Resemblance and Containment of Documents,”
in Compression and Complexity of Sequences 1997: Proceedings, (IEEE, 1997): 21–29, http://gatekeeper.
dec.com/ftp/pub/dec/SRC/publications/broder/positano-final-wpnums.pdf. Other digital humanities
projects, most notably Viral Texts, have used other means for detecting text reuse. The most prominent
of these are algorithms for sequence alignment. (Our “textreuse” package for R also implements the
Smith-Waterman local sequencing algorithm, derived from gene sequencing.) Yet the older and simpler
LSH algorithm sufficed for our purposes because legal sources are easily divided into discrete sections
which can be treated as independent documents. For other approaches, see David Bamman and Gregory
Crane, “Discovering Multilingual Text Reuse in Literary Texts,” white Paper, Perseus Digital Library (2009):
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/publications/2009-Bamman.pdf; Timothy Allen, Charles Cooney, Stéphane
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The result was a matrix of similarity scores, with over 45,000 genuine matches. For
each section in the corpus, after making some adjustments to remove anachronisms and
spurious matches, we were able to identify the section from which it was most likely
borrowed.43 In other words, we had traced the work of the commissioners’ scissors and
paste-pots through the course of their codes.
3. Patterns of borrowing among Field Code jurisdictions
The computational evidence that we assembled revealed patterns in how law migrated at
several different scales of analysis.44 We used the similarity matrix as the input to three
different digital history techniques: network analysis, visualizations, and clustering.
At the broadest scale of analysis, we aggregated the section-to-section borrowings into a
summary of how many sections each code borrowed from each other code. We therefore
can show the connections from one code to another. The resulting network graph reveals
the genealogy of civil procedure in the United States.
The New York Field Codes, especially the finished draft of 1850, were central to the entire
network.45 New York gave rise to different regional traditions within the procedural
Douard, et al., “Plundering Philosophers: Identifying Sources of the Encyclopédie,” Journal of the Associa-
tion for History and Computing 13, no. 1 (2010): http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3310410.0013.107; Glenn
Roe, Russell Horton, and Mark Olsen, “Something Borrowed: Sequence Alignment and the Identification
of Similar Passages in Large Text Collections,” Digital Studies / Le Champ numérique 2, no. 1 (2010): http:
//www.digitalstudies.org/ojs/index.php/digital_studies/article/view/190/235; David A. Smith, Ryan
Cordell, and ElizabethMaddock Dillon, “Infectious Texts: Modeling Text Reuse in Nineteenth-Century News-
papers,” in 2013 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, 2013, 86–94, doi:10.1109/BigData.2013.6691675;
David A. Smith, Ryan Cordell, Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, et al., “Detecting and Modeling Local Text
Reuse,” Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Joint Conference on Digital Libraries (IEEE Computer Society Press, 2014);
Christopher Forstall, Neil Coffee, Thomas Buck, Katherine Roache, and Sarah Jacobson, “Modeling the
scholars: Detecting Intertextuality through Enhanced Word-level N-gram Matching” Digital Scholarship
in the Humanities 30, no. 4 (2015): 503–515; Douglas Ernest Duhaime, “Textual Reuse in the Eigh-
teenth Century: Mining Eliza Haywood’s Quotations,” Digital Humanities Quarterly 10, no. 1 (2016):
http://www.digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/10/1/000229/000229.html.
43We filtered this matrix based on what we knew about the process of borrowing. We removed any match
below a threshold that we determined by checking a sample of matches. Because Jaccard similarity scores
are symmetric, we also removed anachronistic matches. For instance, a code from 1851 obviously did not
borrow from a code from 1877. Furthermore, in chains of borrowing (e.g., NY1850 to CA1851 to CA1868 to
CA1872 to MT1895) the latest section might have a high similarity to all of its ancestors, but it was in fact
borrowed only from the most recent parent. We therefore filtered the similarity matrix to remove matches
within the same code, anachronistic matches, and spurious matches beneath a certain threshold. Then if a
section had multiple matches, we kept the match from the chronologically closest code, giving preference to
codes from the same state, unless there was a substantially closer match from a different code.
44Attention to big and small scales is described in Shawn Graham, Ian Milligan, and Scott Weingart,
Exploring Big Historical Data: The Historian’s Macroscope (Imperial College Press, 2015).
45That New York codes are central is obvious from the visualization, but we also confirmed this by formal
measures of centrality used in network analysis. A network is simply a list of edges (in our case the number
of sections borrowed) between nodes (in our case, the codes). Because even our efforts at determining the
best match for each section sometimes attributed a section to an incorrect code, we pruned the edges of the
graph so that each code was connected to another code only if it borrowed at least fifty sections or twenty
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Figure 5: The structure of borrowings among nineteenth-century codes of civil procedure.
Note that several versions of New York’s Field Code were at the center of the network,
while other states such as California and Ohio became centers of regional variations on the
Field Code. States that adopted any of the variations on the Field Code became part of a
network centered on New York capital.
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network. Variations in the Field drafts meant that different states could borrow different
versions of the Field Code. Field’s 1850 draft—never actually enacted in New York—was
the primary progenitor of several families of codes in California, Kentucky, Iowa, and Ohio,
each of which in turn became major contributors to the law of neighboring states. The
1851 New York code—a small revision to the original 1848 code—became the progenitor of
codes for Wisconsin, Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina. While Field considered
the 1850 version to be the definitive, ideal version of the code, all of the New York codes
from 1848 to 1853 became models for other jurisdictions. In many cases, the commissions
likely used whatever version of the code they had at hand. The Field Code was not a
single volume on the shelf, but a series of drafts, any of which might be more accessible in
different regions and in different years.
Even later New York codes can be considered a separate family. In 1876 a New York
commission produced a new code attempting to consolidate all the case law and statutory
amendments subsequent to the 1851 Field Code. David Dudley Field was upset by the
changes introduced in this revision. A count by a “friend” of Field’s found that only
three sentences of the Field Code had carried over word-for-word into the latest edition.
With respect to Mr. Field or his “friend,” we found that the connection between the codes
somewhat stronger than he thought, although his conclusion that, textually, the 1876 code
did “not appear to be the same thing as before,” remains sound.46
Finally, our corpus included a number of statutes which stood outside the Field Code
tradition, such as Virginia and West Virginia regulations, statutes from Massachusetts
and Maine, and southern codes from Georgia to Louisiana. These statutes show that the
dominance of the Field Code was not total, and a number of older jurisdictions remained
outside of its ambit.47 But nearly every jurisdiction established or reconstructed after 1850
became a part of the Field Code network, and no other tradition achieved anywhere near
the same coherence across state lines.
In addition to the overview of the relationship between codes, we can also see more detail
by visualizing the pattern of borrowings within each code. To illustrate this, we will follow
one branch of the Field Code network, beginning with the family started by California’s
1850 and 1851 codes.
percent of its sections.
Within New York there was a definite chronological progression from the 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851, and 1853
versions of the code, but the development was not chronologically linear. The state legislature enacted the
1848, 1849, and 1851 codes, and these show strong similarities in their relationships. The 1850 and 1853
versions were David Dudley Field’s ideal drafts of the code which were never enacted. They were, however,
printed with wide margins, quality typesetting, and—in the 1850 draft—extensive explanatory notes, all
with an eye towards other jurisdictions copying them as a model. Those two codes show stronger similarity
to one another than to the enacted drafts.
46David Dudley Field, The Latest Edition of the New York Code of Civil Procedure (1878), 21.
47Non-Field jurisdictions occasionally exhibited a borrowing relationship within a state or across two
states. In in a few unusual instances they contributed to codes which were derived from the Field Code.
For example, Alabama’s 1852 Code provided a few sections to Tennessee’s 1858 code, and some states like
Wisconsin copied, along with the Field Code, large passages of pre-code legislation from earlier in the state’s
history.
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California’s 1850 code, enacted in the period when California was entering the Union as
a state, was borrowed almost entirely from New York’s 1849 Field Code. The compiler
Elisha Crosby did lift one portion from the mixed civilian/common law code of Louisiana,
the rules for ordering a new trial to revisit an earlier jury’s verdict. New trials were not
provided for in the New York Code until the finished draft in 1850. Most of the sections
that were not borrowed, as with many of the codes, have to do with parts that describe the
system of courts or provide sample forms of pleading or sheriff’s writs that were peculiar
to each state.
Section borrowed from LA1844 NY1829 NY1848 NY1849 Other
Borrowed sections in CA1850
When Stephen Field revised California’s code in 1851, he largely redrafted it from the
updated code his brother David Dudley had completed for New York in 1850. This
includes the portion of the code on new trials previously borrowed from Louisiana.48
The remainder of the code was borrowed from the 1850 California code. (Many of the
non-matching sections are tables of contents.) Thus California based the majority of its law
of civil remedies entirely on New York’s code not once, but twice. California made few
to no innovations to the Field Code beyond a rearrangement of its provisions and their
application to the new state’s particular system of courts.
Section borrowed from CA1850 NY1850 Other
Borrowed sections in CA1851
The pattern of borrowings in the Washington 1855 code was a rather different case. The
Washington code was definitely in the lineage of the 1851 California code, since it borrowed
sections from both California directly as well as from Oregon (which was also derived
from California). Indiana’s 1852 code and Oregon’s 1854 code provide the majority of the
48Final Report (New York, 1850), §§ 804–809, compared to 1851 California Laws 260, §§ 439–441.
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borrowings. The contiguous bands of borrowings correspond to regulations on judgement
borrowed from Oregon and enforcement provisions borrowed from Indiana. This pattern
likely came about because one of the Washington code commissioners, Edward Lander,
was an Indiana appellate judge from 1850 to 1853, while another commissioner, William
Strong, was a justice of the Oregon Supreme Court in the same years. While working on
the Washington code, they must have each used the law (and the law books) that they
knew best. As a second generation variation on a regional code, the Washington code drew
from a variety of sources, even though all these sources basically agreed on the substance
of the law.
Section borrowed from CA1850CA1851
IN1852
NY1853
OR1854
Other
WI1849
Borrowed sections in WA1855
Finally, we can examine one of the outermost leaves on the family tree of the Field Code
in Washington’s revised code of 1873. The bulk of this code was taken from the early
Washington code with only small amendments. The main exception was lengthy set of
sections on probate drawn from California’s 1872 code. Like many of the last generation
codes, the text of the procedure code had stabilized as a local manifestation of a regional
tradition. The code was still genuinely a Field Code, with a great deal of similarity to the
original New York Field Codes, but its specific form depended on the many edits and
rearrangements that code commissioners from several states had made to the text.
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Section borrowed from CA1872 IN1852 OR1862 Other WA1855
Borrowed sections in WA1873
So far we have retained the context of the surrounding sections within a particular code.
But since our fundamental unit of comparison is section to section, we can use a technique
called clustering to group sections based on their similarity to one another, regardless
of which code they come from. There are innumerable clustering algorithms, but we
used the affinity propagation clustering algorithm because its assumptions aligned with
the characteristics of our problem. That algorithm finds an “exemplar” item which is
most characteristic of the other items in the cluster. That assumption fits nicely with
borrowings from the Field Code, where a single section (likely from a Field Code) had
many borrowings, but where there could also be innovative sections from other states that
might be more influential.49
The result was a set of approximately 2,900 clusters which contained at least five sections,
though this probably overstates the number of innovative, ur-sections in the corpus. The
biggest cluster, which concerned the use of affidavits in pleading, contained 103 sections.
Within each cluster, we organized the sections chronologically. We were thus able to
see the development of the law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction over time. This method
provides historians with a way of noticing small changes in the wording and substance of
the law. Most discussions of algorithmic reading have focused on “distant reading,” or
have balanced the claims of distant reading by using it as a means to enable close reading.
This method of clustering, however, is a kind of algorithmic close reading. By deforming
the texts—taking them out of the context of the codes and putting them into the context of
49Brendan J. Frey and Delbert Dueck, “Clustering by Passing Messages Between Data Points,” Science 315
(2007): 972–976, doi: 10.1126/science.1136800; Ulrich Bodenhofer, Andreas Kothmeier, and Sepp Hochreiter,
“APCluster: An R package for Affinity Propagation Clustering,” Bioinformatics 27 (2011): 2463–2464, doi:
10.1093/bioinformatics/btr406. Even though the affinity propagation algorithm did not fully converge with
our dataset, it did an adequate job clustering the documents. Because there was an exemplar section for each
cluster, we were able to merge clusters whose exemplars had a high Jaccard similarity score.
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their particular variations—we are able to pay attention to those variations.50
Take provisions regulating witness testimony as an example. At common law, parties and
interested witnesses were not permitted to testify in their own causes. Field’s Code re-
versed this rule, expanding witness competency as widely as possible: any person “having
organs of sense” was to be admitted as a witness in New York, with only the insane and
very young children possibly exempted. As the code migrated West, however, legislators
added racial exclusions to Field’s list. The cluster of sections in the appendix documents
how California’s codifiers grafted earlier prohibitions from midwestern states into Field’s
Code. Many other codes then evidenced a remarkable uniformity with California’s text
(which later changed only to add “Mongolian” to the list of races). Iowa’s Code had a more
minor influence, and Wyoming developed the only truly original section which made it
explicit that the exclusion was based on the racist assumption that non-white peoples were
infantilized, a connection only implicit in other jurisdictions.
Uniformity in the law, as shown through these clusters, is just as instructive as variation.
The most significant clusters that we investigated related to the collection of debts. These
were clusters which went against the typical pattern we observed. While most clusters
exhibited regional variation as they grewmore distant from the Field Code, clusters having
to do with creditors’ remedies were almost completely uniform across the American West
and South. No single section of the code announced its preference for creditors’ rights;
rather, the acceleration of creditors’ remedies resulted from the combination of several
sections. In New York’s original enacted code from 1848, § 107 required a defendant to
answer the complaint within twenty days, instead of at the next court session (which
in some cases could have been as far as three months away); § 202 provided for default
judgment as a matter of course, issued by a clerk without a judicial order if no adequate
answer was received within the twenty days; §§ 128–133 abolished fictitious pleadings and
required answers to state true facts verified by a defendant’s oath, all so that no trial would
delay the enforcement of uncontestable obligations; finally, the code abolished a traditional
thirty-day waiting period between issue of judgment and commencement of execution.
These provisions dealt with what merchants and capitalists perceived as an abuse of the
common law system, where defendants in cases of debt could stretch out enforcement of
debt collection for as long as two years. The Field Code’s summary judgment brought
down the time of debt collection to a matter of weeks. The code thus traded the rhythms
of agriculture for the rhythms of merchant finance.51
Clustering each of these sections reveals that western states along with the former Confed-
erate states of South Carolina, North Carolina, and Florida copied each provision almost
exactly. Midwestern and Upper South states that had already developed and maintained
commercial ties to Chicago and New Orleans by 1850 varied the New York rules, some-
times by requiring answers only in term time, or permitting only a judge to decree default
judgment rather than a clerk, in either case effectively stretching out enforcement and
50Lisa Samuels and Jerome McGann, “Deformance and Interpretation” New Literary History 30, no. 1
(1999): 25–56; Mark Sample, “Notes toward a Deformed Humanities,” blog post, 2 May 2012: http://www.
samplereality.com/2012/05/02/notes-towards-a-deformed-humanities/; Ramsay, Reading Machines, 32–57.
51First Report (New York, 1848), 197.
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making a formal trial more likely. But in the Reconstruction South, and in the West over
the same period, regardless of whether a jurisdiction abolished chancery or not, regardless
of the racial exclusions it may have placed on witness testimony, the provisions on debt
collection remained unchanged. When it came to creditors’ remedies, the law of New York
became the law of the land.
4. Procedure codes and American capitalism
The near uniformity of creditors’ remedies in Field Code states, as demonstrated by
clustering, points out the close link between the rise of modern American procedure and
modern American capitalism. Westerners and southerners frequently commented on the
seeming imperialism of the New York code and its connections to New York capital, but
one must turn to the technical debates over procedure to find these anxieties. Twelve of
the states and territories that copied the Field Code most closely did so during the Civil
War and Reconstruction era—four states in the former Confederacy and eight jurisdictions
in the Far West.52 As with other areas of postbellum history, it turns out one may learn a
lot by holding the postbellum American South and American West together.
In the last decade, scholars of Reconstruction have broadened the scope of their study to
include both the South and the West as two sites in one “Greater Reconstruction.” These
studies have illustrated the ways that military conquest, rapid industrialization, and
the resettlement and education of ethnic minorities developed similarly in each region,
guided by and political elites in Washington.53 In tracing the legal aspects of this Greater
Reconstruction, scholars have focused almost entirely on the expansion of federal power
or constitutional rights of citizenship and civil equality.54 While the 1860s and 1870s were
of course a transformative period in the history of civil rights and the creation of a national
state, they were also the decades in which many local legal institutions and practices
were transformed not by federal power but by state codification. Naomi Lamoreaux
and John Joseph Wallis have recently argued that in the creation of a modern American
economy, “the federal government played no role in this process until the Civil War, and
even then it played only a bit part.” The history of the Field Code’s migration helps
to substantiate this claim. While Lamoreaux and Wallis focus on the development of
52Those jurisdictions were Nevada (1861), Dakota Territory—which retained the Code when split into
North and South (1862), Idaho (1864), Arizona (1864), Montana (1865), Arkansas (1868), North Carolina
(1868), Wyoming (1869), Florida (1870), South Carolina (1870), Utah (1870), and Colorado (1877).
53Elliott West, “Reconstructing Race,” Western Historical Quarterly 34 (2003): 6. See also Heather Cox
Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (Yale University Press,
2007); Sven Beckert,Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–
1896 (Harvard, 2003); Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction
(University of North Carolina Press, 2014). The major application of the Greater Reconstruction idea to
legal history has been Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in
Nineteenth-Century America (University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
54See, for instance, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (Yale,
1999); Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions
in American Political History (Princeton, 2003); Edward Purcell, Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 1870–1958 (Oxford, 1992).
25
banking, transportation, and incorporation at the state level, it was the Procedure Code
that structured civil remedies to protect these institutions. And procedure codes were
creatures of the states.55
The states that adopted the Field Code had other options available to them. Southern
states with a civilian code tradition such as Louisiana and Alabama offered alternative
ways to reform common law practice.56 Illinois, on the other hand, long retained the
common law—in later decades lawyers called it “the Yellowstone Park of common law
pleading.” When Colorado was a territory it imported Illinois common law via statute, a
full seventeen years before its legislature considered the Field Code.57
But what codifiers sawwhen they looked at NewYork, more so than at Louisiana, Alabama,
or Illinois, was the Empire State of commercial capital. The fears, demands, and desires
of a personified Capital continually wielded promises—and threats—in the debates over
procedural codification. The earlyMormon settlers of Utah persistently avoided themining
frenzy as well as codification. By 1870, however, the territory’s governor directed the
legislature’s attention to the recent Code of Nevada, a code “for a people whose interests
in many respects are similar to our own.” Of course, standing behind the Nevada Code
was “the State of New York—a State which is an empire in itself and whose commercial
transactions are far greater than those of any other State in the Union.” By copying its
code, Utah too could be “rewarded by equal advantages.”58 Code proponents in Colorado
similarly pointed to the fact that the code had been “adopted twenty-nine years ago by the
Empire state of the Union,” and they too hoped that the code of the nation’s commercial
empire brought wealth in its wake.59
When a Colorado legislator scoffed at the idea that capitalists could possibly care about the
difference between old common law and modern code remedies, his adversaries rebuked
him. “Mr. Hamill replied that he knew of one California company of capitalists who were
deterred from investing in mining property here wholly on account of the practice of the
courts in mining cases. If we had had this code years ago, Colorado would now have a
larger amount of California capital in her mines.”60 Codifiers argued that, in attracting
capital, procedure was at least as important as the substantive rules of property and
55Naomi Lamoreaux and John Joseph Wallis, “States, Not Nation: The Sources of Political and Economic
Development in the Early United States,” paper presented at the Economic History Workshop, Harvard
University, March 4, 2016.
56For instance, although Tennessee in 1858 adapted nearly 225 sections of its code from Field codes, the
state also incorporated nearly 50 sections of the 1852 Code of Alabama, one of the largest borrowings of
southern legislation within the corpus we collected.
57See Charles E. Clark, “The New Illinois Civil Practice Act,” University of Chicago Law Review 1 (1933):
209. Nevertheless, even Illinois had substantial legislation organizing the courts and prescribing certain
common law processes for obtaining civil remedies, and Colorado adapted the bulk of this legislation when
it organized as a territory, a full seventeen years before its legislature considered adopting the Field Code.
58Journal of the Assembly of the Territory of Utah (1870), 15. See also Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin
Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-Day Saints, 1830–1900, new edition (University of Illinois Press,
2004).
59“The Code Again,” Pueblo Daily Chieftain, February 25, 1877.
60“The Legislature: The Senate Devotes Another Day to the Code,” Denver Daily Tribune, February 17,
1877.
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contract, because procedure secured the remedies that actually protected investments.
“Men of capital and enterprise will not make investments and devote their time and
energies to those works of internal improvement,” Nebraska’s governor reasoned, “unless
ample protection is afforded them, by legal enactment, for the capital invested and labor
employed.” He therefore urged swift passage of the Field Code.61
Receiving innumerable letters complaining that under the code, “no one will be benefited,
except perhaps some Northern Capitalists,” a North Carolina commissioner undertook
an anonymous defense of the new code in theWeekly Standard. He encouraged the bar to
accommodate themselves to change, for “the New York system . . . bids fair to become
national.” Purporting to give an overview of the code, the articles were almost entirely
about credit. “How can we create credit? By punctuality,” the commissioner wrote. “And
how create punctuality? by law, and by law alone. Let the law enforce punctuality; let
the people of North Carolina learn that the great law of business is, that ‘time is of the
essence of the contract.’ ” Under the more certain and speedy remedies of the code, “we
may expect that . . . even that the vaults of the banks of New-York . . . will be open to our
industry.”62
As in postbellum North Carolina, establishing a flow of credit through the remedial
system became a leading priority of western lawyers. While the new western history
has shed significant light on neglected topics of Indian dispossession and environmental
management, it has often done so by leaving out of view matters of political economy,
a staple of the old western history. As one work in that older tradition argued, “Debt
collection was the central part of law practice for the [western] bar and remained a key
part of private practice throughout the century.”63 On that understanding, one western
lawyer succinctly summarized the difference between the code and the common law as
“whether a merchant had better try to collect a $500 note or burn it up.” Tiring of all the
focus on creditors’ remedies, one legislator observed that he “never knew one of these
professionals who undertook to write up the beauties of the New York code, . . . that he did
not also break out somewhere with ‘take for instance the case of an action on a promissory
note,’ as though the collection of notes was about all there could be any law needed for.”64
The creditors’ remedies in the code gave the codifiers their leading argument against
criticisms rooted in the ideology of popular sovereignty. “There is no doubt but the
people are in favor of anything that promises to hurry up . . . Justice, and they will go for
61Governor’s Message, in Journal of the House of Assembly of the Territory of Nebraska (1857), 12.
62William A. Jenkins to William Blount Rodman, January 14, 1868, Rodman Papers. East Carolina
University Library, Special Collections. Rodman’s explication of the Code appeared in three sequentially
numbered articles in the Standard on August 14, 15, and 16, 1868, under the title “The Code of Civil
Procedure.” Rodman disclosed his authorship in private correspondence with Barringer. See Barringer to
Rodman, August 21, 1868, Rodman Papers.
63Gordon Morris Bakken, Practicing Law in Frontier California (Nebraska 1991), 51–54. The new western
history ushered in by Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West
(Norton, 1987) and Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the American West
(Oklahoma, 1991) is now returning to issues of political economy. See Patricia Nelson Limerick, A Ditch in
Time: The City, the West, and Water (Fulcrum, 2012); Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the
Making of Modern America (Norton, 2011).
64“The Code,” Denver Daily Tribune, January 10, 1877; “The Code,” Denver Daily Times, January 27, 1877.
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the old code,” one Colorado newspaper announced.65 New York’s “code practice is the
best in excellence,” stated another, “and when I say best I do not mean best for lawyers
only, but best for the people—the commonwealth.”66 If the people favored economic
progress, certainty of remedy, and efficiency in proceedings, then they favored the New
York code, no matter whether they understood or cared about technical rules of pleading
and remedies. Thus, in their arguments the codifiers imagined themselves the champions
of popular sovereignty, for it was they who accomplished what the people actually desired.
Thus by the end of Reconstruction, New York’s domestic empire of capital and creditors’
remedies bore a remarkable resemblance to the international empire administered by Eng-
land. Both jurisdictions, while reforming the practice of law, remained ambivalent about
codification within their own borders but encouraged it among their economic dependents.
The English commissioned codes for India and Singapore, while Field’s additional codes
covering New York’s civil and penal law—ignored in his home state—were adopted in
California and other western jurisdictions.67 In both England and New York, leading argu-
ments against codification carried a civilizational logic of empire: advanced metropoles
could not codify their law, for to do so would be to freeze the progress of legal science.
What appeared to some to be a hopeless mass of confusion was to common law defenders
the sign of true legal sophistication. Science was, after all, complex.68 The later editions
of the New York Procedure Code came in for censure precisely for trying to capture all
the sophistication of the New York legal system within an unwieldy 3,300 rules.69 Codifi-
cation, however, could help developing societies along law’s frontier take a progressive
leap forward. As India’s chief codifier Thomas Macaulay explained, codification “cannot
be well performed in an age of barbarism,” but also “cannot without great difficulty be
performed in an age of freedom.” As India balanced between the two, however, “it is the
work which especially belongs to a government like that of India—to an enlightened and
paternal despotism.”70
In America, Macaulay’s tool of enlightened despotism spread with the anxiety that capital
from the nation’s economic center would remain scarce without a code of remedies that,
if not in fact the law of New York, was at least prescribed by New York lawyers and
their corporate clients. In the two most populous and commercially advanced western
states, Texas and Illinois, the need for New York capital failed to move state legislators to
adopt the code at the expense of popular sovereignty (despite concerted efforts in both
65“A Code of Civil Procedure,” Denver Daily Times, January 12, 1877.
66“The Code,” Denver Daily Tribune, January 31, 1877.
67See Gunther A. Weiss, “The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-LawWorld,” Yale Journal of
International Law 25 (2000): 435. For a thorough study of the ideology of codification in India, see Robert
A. Yelle, The Language of Disenchantment: Protestant Literalism and Colonial Discourse in British India (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
68See, for instance, James C. Carter’s classic defense of the common law against codification, “The Ideal
and the Actual in the Law,” Address to the American Bar Association, August 21, 1890, at 28 (“the legislature
should never attempt to perform the function of the judge, that of simply ascertaining and declaring existing
customs. This is the work of experts who can qualify themselves only by the devotion of their lives.”).
69See, for instance, “Note,” Albany Law Journal 29 (1884): 141–42; Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court,
55–56.
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jurisdictions).71 Lacking the self-sufficiency of those two jurisdictions, the other states of
Greater Reconstruction in America adopted a foreign code, but lawyers, legislators, and
their supporters claimed the endorsement of popular sovereignty in doing so. Even in
North Carolina, whose Democratic newspapers daily called for the repeal of “this child
of the carpet baggers,” Republican editors proclaimed that “the movement” towards
procedural codification “comes from the people, from the instinctive logic by which an
unprejudiced mind grasps the advantages of the system.”72
Conclusion
By addressing our historical questions to a sufficiently large but narrowly defined corpus
of sources, we benefited from a useful symbiosis of traditional and digital historical
methods. Our computational methods produced useful historical knowledge because they
were carefully tailored to what we knew about the data from traditional historical work.
We knew that code commissioners worked with “the scissors and paste-pot,” as critics
complained, and we examined codes in the archives which showed how commissions
literally marked up the legislation of other states. While we think that one of the most
useful things about digital history is its ability to start with large corpora and then figure
out what was interesting from the past, we have shown how digital history can also operate
by starting with specific historical questions rather than particular sources. We have shown
how a collection of methods from computer science, including minhash/locality-sensitive
hashing, affinity propagation clustering, and network analysis, along with the concept of
text deformance from literary studies, can be used to good effect in tracking the changes
in the law, as well as any other discursive field whose texts can be readily divided into
sections. Finally we have shown how it is possible to work on different scales, using
network analysis, visualization, and algorithmic close reading, and thus to gain both a
broad overview of the law’s migration, as well as a highly detailed view of the changes in
the law.
The history of codification on the American periphery challenges foundational assump-
tions about American federalism. Scholars commonly speak of regulating at “the state
level” imagining an equality between state sovereignties that exists in tension only with
“the federal level.” But the history of legal practice and civil remedies is one in which
the localism fostered by common law practice rapidly gave way to uniform regulations
promulgated by New York trial lawyers without the slightest interference of the federal
government.73 The history of the Code also has important implications for recent scholar-
71Texas commissioned the preparation of a code of civil procedure in 1855, and the legislature scheduled
an extra session to consider it but ultimately never passed the law. 21 Texas Reports (Hartley) xi (1882); Texas
State Times, December 15, 1855. Reformers in the 1869 convention in Illinois attempted to pass a provision
similar to the one in New York’s 1846 constitution, which would have required the legislature to appoint a
commission to revise practice and pleadings along the lines of the Field Code. See Debates and Proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois (1870), 1496–1498.
72“The Code,”Weekly Standard (Raleigh), May 26, 1869.
73The equality of the states is a foundational assumption in the much-criticized idea of the states as
laboratories for regulatory experimentation. The states-as-laboratories idea emerged from New State Ice
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ship seeking to unearth a long tradition of “administrative law” among the states before
the twentieth century. These accounts have largely focused on administrative adjudication
or discretionary regulation within a narrow domain, such as customs houses, but have so
far neglected the most widespread and significant instance of nineteenth-century admin-
istrative lawmaking in America—the spread of remedial codes through extra-legislative
commissions.74 While these histories have sought to demonstrate that nineteenth-century
Americans could be quite comfortable with administrative law, accepting it as a normal
part of the constitutional order, this chapter has shown how lawmaking by commission
generated significant political controversy and raised grave questions about popular
sovereignty that over time were merely dodged rather than answered.
In the economically developing West and re-developing South, anxieties over the lack of
capital—both among the bar as well as voters—joined with arguments about civilization
and progress to spur many jurisdictions to copy the text of the code of New York, the
Empire State of capital. The short legislative sessions of American lawmaking limited the
options available for re-imagining or re-crafting what could become the law of remedies
and legal practice. And in the economically underdeveloped parts of the country, periods
of opportunity could be short indeed. Capital might quickly pass over one region and favor
another, and each month more lawyers arrived hoping to make a start in a jurisdiction
where economic progress was just about to take off.
This study thus gets at the heart of lawmaking in U.S. history. Lawyers and judges,
politicians and newspaper editors warred over whether codes that were drafted by com-
missioners and borrowed wholesale from beyond a jurisdiction’s borders were actually
democratic. Codifiers responded by transmuting democratic theory into support for a
remedial code that elected legislators had neither the time nor inclination to read. Popular
support for commercial development was taken to indicate popular support for New
York’s civil remedies, especially the cheapened and accelerated collection of debts. In
many jurisdictions the exact language of the Field Code remains on the books, and its basic
provisions for civil procedure are in force throughout the United States. Without too much
exaggeration we might say that our method has revealed the spine of modern American
legal practice.
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See James A. Gardner, “The ‘States-as-
Laboratories’ Metaphor in State Constitutional Law,” Valparaiso University Law Review 30 (1996), 475. For a
collection of refutations, see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, “Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments,” Emory Law Journal 58 (2009), 1333. Even as federalism scholars vigorously
refute the idea of states as “laboratories” for regulative experimentation, they continually pose “the federal”
to “the state” level, with an assumed equality among the numerous sovereignties in the latter category. See,
for instance, James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy, eds., Federalism and Subsidiarity (NYU 2014); Heather Gerken,
Beyond Sovereignty, Beyond Autonomy: A Nationalist’s View of Federalism’s Future (forthcoming).
74See Daniel Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014); Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law (Yale Law Library, 2012); Gautham Rao, National Duties: Custom
Houses and the Making of the American State (University of Chicago, 2016).
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Appendix: Clustering sections involving witness exclusions
This sample cluster brings together sections that involve race-based exclusions from
witness testimony in civil trials, with commentary on the history of the variations.
Disqualifying the testimony of non-white parties and witnesses was not new to the proce-
dure codes. The following laws from midwestern states with large free black populations
would be echoed in adaptations of the Field Code.
Code Section
OH 1807 That no black or mulatto person or persons, shall hereafter
be permitted to be sworn or give evidence in any court of
record, or elsewhere in this state, in any cause depending,
or matter of controversy, where either party to the same is
a white person, or in any prosecution, which shall be
instituted in behalf of this state, against any white person.
IA 1839 A negro, mulatto, or Indian, shall not be a witness in any
court or in any case against a white person.
IN 1843 No negro, mulatto or Indian, shall be a witness, except in
pleas of the state against negroes, mulattoes, or Indians,
and in civil causes where negroes, mulattoes, or Indians
alone are parties: every person other than a negro having
one-fourth part of negro blood or more, or any one of
whose grandfathers or grandmothers shall have been a
negro, shall be deemed an incompetent witness, within the
provisions of this article.
Racial disqualifications were introduced to the Field Code tradition in California, first in
Elisha Crosby’s draft of 1850, then in Stephen J. Field’s draft of 1851. Many western states
copied Stephen Field’s provision.
Code Section
CA 1850 306. No black, or mulatto person, or Indian, shall be
permitted to give evidence in any action to which a white
person is a party, in any Court of this State. Every person
who shall have one eighth part or more of negro blood, shall
be deemed a mulatto; and every person who shall have one
half Indian blood, shall be deemed an Indian.
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Code Section
CA 1851 394. The following persons shall not be witnesses: lst. Those
who are of unsound mind at the time of their production for
examination; 2d. Children under ten years of age, who
appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them
truly: and; 3d. Indians, or persons having one fourth or
more of Indian blood, in an action or proceeding to which a
white person is a party: 4th. Negroes, or persons having one
half or more Negro blood, in an action or proceeding to
which a white person is a party.
OR 1854 6. The following persons shall not be competent to testify: 1.
Those who are of unsound mind, or intoxicated at the time
of their production for examination; 2. Children under ten
years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined,
or of relating them truly; 3. Negroes, mulattoes and Indians,
or persons one half or more of Indian blood, in an action or
proceeding to which a white person is a party.
WA 1855 293. The following persons shall not be competent to testify:
1st. Those who are of unsound mind, or intoxicated at the
time of their production for examination. 2d. Children
under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving
just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are
examined, or of relating -them truly. 3d. Indians, or persons
having more than one half Indian blood, in an action or
proceeding to which a white person is a party.
UT 1859 215. The following persons shall not be competent to testify:
1. Those who are of unsound mind or intoxicated at the time
of their production for examination. 2. Children under ten
years of age, who appear to be incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined
or of relating them truly. Negroes, mulattos, and Indians, or
persons having one fourth of negro or Indian blood, in an
action or proceeding to which a white person is a party, but
shall not be disqualified from testifying against another.
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NV 1861 342. The following persons shall not be witnesses: First.
Those who are of unsound mind at the time of their
production for examination. Second. Children under ten
years of age, who, in the opinion of the court, appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them
truly. Third. Indians, or persons having one half or more of
Indian blood, and negroes, or persons having one half or
more of negro blood, in an action or proceeding to which a
white person is a party. Fourth. Persons against whom
judgment as been rendered upon a conviction for a felony,
unless pardoned by the governor, or such judgment has
been reversed on appeal.
ID 1864 352. The following persons shall not be witnesses: First.
Those who are of unsound mind at the time of their
production for examination. Second. Children under ten
years of age, who, in the opinion of the court, appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them
truly. Third. Chinamen or persons having one-half or more
of China blood; Indians, or persons having one-half or more
of Indian blood, and negroes, or persons having one-half or
more of negro blood, in an action or proceeding to which a
white person is a party. Fourth. Persons against whom
judgment has been rendered upon a conviction or felony,
unless pardoned by the governor, or such judgment has
been reversed on appeal.
AZ 1865 396. The following persons shall not be witnesses: 1. Those
who are of unsound mind at the time of their production for
examination. 2. Children under ten years of age, who
appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them
truly; and, 3. Indiana or persons having one-half or more of
Indian blood, in an action or proceeding to which a white
person is a party. 4. Negroes, or persons having one-half or
more negro blood, in an action or, proceeding to which a
white person is a party.
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CA 1868 394. The following persons shall not he witnesses: First.
Those who are of unsound mind at the time of their
production for examination. Second. Children under ten
years of age, who, in the opinion of the court, appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them
truly. Third. Mongolians, Chinese, or Indians, or persons
having one-half or more of Indian blood, in an action or
proceeding wherein a white person is a party. Fourth.
Persons against whom judgment has been rendered upon a
conviction for a felony, unless pardoned by the governor, or
such judgment has been reversed on appeal.
Kentucky differed from other code states by making no distinction between incompetency
(an absolute bar) and privilege (which might be waived). Kentucky also maintained a
strict disqualification of parties and interested witnesses while other Field Code states
made parties at least partially competent to stand examination.
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KY 1851 568. The following persons shall be incompetent
to testify: 1. Persons convicted of a capital
offense, or of perjury, subornation of perjury;
burglary, robbery, larceny, receiving stolen
goods, forgery, or counterfeiting. 2. Infants
under the age of ten years, and over that age, if
incapable of understanding the obligation of an
oath. 3. Persons who are of unsound mind at the
time of being produced as witnesses. 4.
Husband and wife, for or against each other, or
concerning any communication made by one to
the other, during the marriage, whether called as
a witness while that relation subsisted or
afterwards. 5. An attorney, concerning any
communication made to him by his client in that
relation, or his advice thereon, without the
client’s consent. 6. Persons interested in an issue,
in behalf of themselves, and parties to an issue,
in behalf of themselves or those united with
them in the issue. 7. Negroes, mulattoes, or
Indians, in any action or proceeding where a
white person, in his own right, or as
representative of a white person, is a party,
except in actions brought to recover a penalty or
forfeiture for a violation of law, against a negro,
mulatto, or Indian.
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MT 1865 320. The following persons shall be incompetent
to testify: First, Persons who are of an unsound
mind at the time of their production for
examination. Second, Children under ten years
of age who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts respecting which they
are examined or of relating them truly, but the
court in its discretion may allow such children to
testify, and the facts herein enumerated shall go
to their credibility. Third, Husband or wife for or
against each other, or concerning any
communication made by one to the other during
the marriage, whether called as a witness while
that relation existed or afterwards. Fourth, An
attorney concerning any communication made
to him by his client in that relation, or his advice
thereon, without the client’s consent. Fifth, A
clergyman or priest concerning any confession
made to him, in his professional character, in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs, without the consent of the
person making the confession. Sixth, A negro,
Indian, or Chinaman, where the parties to the
action are white persons, but if the parties to an
action or either of the parties is an Indian, negro,
or Chinaman, a negro may be introduced as a
witness against such negro, an Indian against
such Indian, or a Chinaman against such
Chinaman. A negro within the meaning of this
act is a person having one-eighth or more of
negro blood, an Indian is a person having
one-half or more of Indian blood, and a
Chinaman is a person having one-half or more
Chinese blood.
Iowa’s code began by defining competency purely in terms of understanding the legal
oath, and in the same section it barred non-white testimony (even if non-white actors
could understand the oath). Wyoming followed the same tack, but softened the racial
bar by adopting the same standard used for children: only those adjudged incapable of
perceiving and relating facts were barred from testifying.
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IA 1851 2388. Every human being of sufficient capacity
to understand the obligation of an oath is a
competent witness in all cases both civil and
criminal except as herein otherwise declared.
But an indian, a negro, a mulatto or black person
shall not be allowed to give testimony in any
cause wherein a white person is a party.
NE 1855 2388. Every human being of sufficient capacity
to understand the obligation of an oath is a
competent witness in all cases both civil and
criminal except as herein otherwise declared.
But an indian, a negro, a mulatto or black person
shall not be allowed to give testimony in any
cause wherein a white person is a party.
WY 1870 325. Every human being of sufficient capacity to
understand the obligations of an oath, is a
competent witness in all cases, civil and
criminal, except as otherwise herein declared.
The following persons shall be incompetent to
testify: First, Persons of unsound mind at the
time of their production. Second, Indians and
negroes who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts respecting which they
are examined, or of relating them intelligently
and truly. Third Husband and wife, concerning
any communication made by one to the other
during the marriage, whether called as a witness
while that relation exists or afterwards. Fourth,
An attorney, concerning any communication
made to him by his client in that relation or his
advice thereon, without the client’s consent in
open court or in writing produced in court. Fifth,
A clergyman or priest, concerning any
confession made to him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church to which he belongs, without the
consent of the person making the confession.
States that did not borrow Field’s evidence code nevertheless borrowed prohibitions of
non-white testimony. Two distinct strands emerge in legislation from the Deep South as
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MS 1848 All negroes, mulattoes, Indians, and all persons
of mixed blood, descended from negro or Indian
ancestors, to the third generation, inclusive,
though one ancestor of each generation may
have been a white person, shall be incapable in
law, to be witnesses in any case whatsoever,
except for and against each other.
AL 1852 2276. Negroes, mulattoes, Indians, and all
persons of mixed blood, descended from negro
or Indian ancestors, to the third generation
inclusive, though one ancestor of each
generation may have been a white person,
whether bond or e, must not be Witnesses in any
cause, civil or criminal, except for or against
each other.
TN 1858 3808. A negro, mulatto, Indian, or person of
mixed blood, descended from negro or Indian
ancestors, to the third generation inclusive,
though one ancestor of each generation may
have been a white person, whether bond or free,
is incapable of being a witness in any cause, civil
or criminal, except for or against each other.
DC 1857 A negro shall be a competent witness for or
against a negro in any criminal proceeding, and
shall be a competent witness in any civil case to
which only negroes are parties, but not in any
other case.
VA 1860 A negro or indian shall he a competent witness
in a case of the commonwealth for or against a
negro or indian, or in a civil ease to which only
negroes or indians are parties, but not in any
other case.
IL 1866 A negro, mulatto or Indian shall not be a witness
in any court, or in any case, against a white
person. Any person having one-fourth part
negro blood shall be adjudged a mulatto.
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